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Este artículo utiliza un concepto
particular de paradigma de política
pública para analizar el núcleo ideo-
lógico del principal programa anti-
pobreza que ha implementado el
gobierno federal en las últimas dé-
cadas: Oportunidades. En particular,
este estudio analiza la compatibili-
dad entre este programa y el propó-
sito de garantizar los derechos socio-
económicos de la infancia. Para ello,
se examinan las principales carac-
terísticas del paradigma implícito
en este programa, así como su
evolución durante en el periodo de
1989 a 2006. Este estudio concluye
que el paradigma neoliberal apli-
cado durante este tiempo implica
tensiones y contradicciones impor-
tantes al momento de ofrecer una
respuesta para proteger los dere-
chos de la infancia mexicana. 
Palabras clave: derechos de los ni-
ños, paradigmas de políticas, pobre-
za infantil, política social en México.
Applying the particular concept of
policy paradigm, this paper analy-
ses the ideological core of the main
anti-poverty programme implemen-
ted by the Mexican federal govern-
ment, Oportunidades, in the last
decades. In particular, this study
analyses the compatibility of this
programme with the aim of pro-
tecting children´s socio-economic
rights. To do so, this study exami-
nes the main characteristics of the
policy paradigm that underpins this
programme, as well as its evolution
from 1989 to 2006. This paper con-
cludes that the neoliberal paradigm
applied during this time implies im-
portant conceptual tensions and
contradictions at the moment of of-
fering a policy answer for protect-
ing the rights of Mexican children.   
Key words: children´s rights, policy
paradigm, child poverty, social po-
licy in Mexico.
Resumen / Abstract1. Introduction
n Mexico, the introduction of neoliberalism can be traced
back to the early 1980s. Some studies have pointed out that, during this neo-
liberal era, the Mexican welfare system has experience a move towards a
more residual character (Valencia, 2010, Boltvinik, 2004; Laurell, 2003). This
residual character essentially involves that “social policy is subordinated to fis-
cal and budget constraints” and devoted to attend people living on extreme
poverty (Barba, 2004: 96). However, in 1989, Mexico signed the Convention
on the Rights of the Child (CRC), which was ratified in the following year. By
doing so, the Mexican government implicitly started its commitment to pro-
tecting and ensuring all children's socio-economic and cultural rights, in-
cluding the rights to a decent way of life and social security.  
The main purpose of this paper is to analyse the compatibility between
the main ideas of the neoliberalism and the pledge of protecting children´s
rights in Mexico. To do so, this study applies a particular definition of policy
paradigm in order to analyse the ideological core of the neoliberal paradigm
to tackle poverty in Mexico. The evolution of this paradigm from 1989 to 2006
is also examined. This study is based on the analysis of official documents
that described the features of the main anti-poverty initiatives in the last two
decades, in particular Oportunidades programme, as well as other relevant
literature. Additionally, this analysis includes the perceptions of key policy ac-
tors about the policy actions for protecting socio-economic rights of the chil-
dren in Mexico.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. The second section
provides a definition of policy paradigm. Additionally, a broad picture of the
evolution of the Mexican poverty neoliberal paradigm prior to its consolidation
is presented. The third section comprises the analysis of the key elements of
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Ithe neoliberal paradigm to tackle poverty, which emblematic programme
(Progresa-Oportunidades) was implemented since 1997. In the fourth sec-
tion, the main tensions between this paradigm and the main principles im-
plicit in the CRC are discussed. The final sections include some concluding
remarks.
2. Social policy and the neoliberalism in Mexico 
2.1 Defining a neoliberal policy paradigm
Neoliberalism is subject to multiple definitions. Harvey (2005) proposes that
neoliberalism “is in the first instance a theory of political economic practices
that proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating in-
dividual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework
characterized by strong private property rights, free markets and free trade”
(Harvey, 2005:2). Under this theory, “the role of the state is to create and pre-
serve an institutional framework appropriate to such practices” (Harvey,
2005). Accordingly, the economic policy prescriptions emanated from this
paradigm focused on enhancing economic efficiency and international com-
petitiveness. In the case of social policy, neoliberal policies are associated to
the anti-poverty strategy supported by international institutions like the In-
ternational Monetary Fund and the World Bank. This strategy basically con-
sists in three elements: economic growth, investing in human capital,
especially education, and safety nets for the poor (Gordon, 2004; Addison &
Cornia, 2001).
In this paper, neoliberalism is used to denominate a particular policy para-
digm. A policy paradigm, as here defined, involves two main features. First,
it comprises a relatively coherent set of scientific, technical and normative
assumptions which provide guidelines to define a policy problem (for instan-
ce, poverty), as well as to delineate the corresponding prescriptive elements
to tackle it, such as “principles of action” and “methodological prescriptions
and practices” (Surel, 2000). Second, policy paradigms are shared by a group
of policy actors, which limit the range of alternatives “likely to perceive as
useful and worth considering” (Campbell 2004: 385). Surel (2000) identified
four key elements of a policy paradigm, which are the following: (1) basic
principles or “ontological beliefs” that define the core of policy programme
(for instance, market is the best mechanism to allocate resources; (2) specific
principles that imply a general choice of action (for example, to assist the ex-
treme poor in participating in the labour market); (3) mechanisms, tech-
niques and methods (for instance, the measurement of extreme poverty to
focalised aid to the extreme poor); and (4) specific instruments or detailed de-
cisions concerning the application of mechanisms (Surel, 2000: 497-98).
Following Surel´s definition of policy paradigm, the main basic principles
of a neoliberal paradigm can be equated to the following values: the indivi-
dual; freedom of choice; market security; laissez faire, and minimal govern-
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imply a general choice of action is related to the role of the state in the eco-
nomy and society: the state should be limited to “securing private property
rights and contracts” (Albo, 2002: 46). Another principle is that markets are
“the most desirable mechanism for regulating both domestic and world
economies” (Fourcade-Gourinchas & Babb, 2002: 533). In consequence, in
the social policy realm, neoliberal policies involve “the rolling back of the wel-
fare state activities, and new emphasis on market provisioning of formerly
public goods and services” (Lerner, 2000: 7). 
Nonetheless, neoliberalism is translated into specific policy prescription
in different ways, according to particular national contexts (Albo, 2002; Ler-
ner, 2000). This paper is concern with the policy paradigm implemented to
tackle poverty in Mexico in the last two decades. Before identifying the key ele-
ments of this paradigm, the beginning of such paradigm before its consoli-
dation is briefly discussed in the next sub-sections.
2.2 The beginning of neoliberalism in Mexico 
The Mexican Revolution gave birth to a new Constitution in 1917. Social rights
such as housing, education and health care, among others, became consti-
tutional guarantees for every Mexican (Brachet, 1994). Nonetheless, from the
1940's and until the beginning of the 1980's, the state practically limited its
mission for social justice to ensuring universal access to basic education (Bra-
chet-Márquez, 2004; 1994). Hence, despite the official universalistic aim in
terms of social welfare, the Mexican government never achieved universal
coverage of basic rights, such as health care or housing during those decades
(Ordoñez, 2001).
Instead, the Mexican government built a social security system for organi-
sed workers through different institutions and under a corporatist model.1
Accordingly, health care services and other social rights such as pensions,
maternity leave and accident benefits, among others, were provided to those
Mexicans working in the formal sectors of the economy. Workers and em-
ployees who were affiliated to the unions of strategic state-owned industries,
such oil or electricity, obtained particularly generous social protection
schemes (Brachet-Márquez, 1994). Conversely, those working in the infor-
mal sectors in urban and rural areas (for instance, peasants) lacked social
security. In addition, the federal government provided some universal subsi-
dies for different services, such as electricity and water and basic food prod-
ucts (especially, tortilla2 and milk) (Damian, 2002). These subsidies mostly
favoured the population in urban areas, but also benefited the poorest po-
pulation in the whole country (Damian, 2002). These institutional features
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1 According to Esping-Andersen (1990), in the corporatist-conservative welfare regime, which it typical of continen-
tal European countries, social security is linked to the type of employment and contributions made by individuals. 
2 Tortilla is one basic ingredient of the Mexican diet, especially for those with the lowest income.resulted in “dual” model in which social protection and security systems are
highly strati-fied (see Valencia, 2010; 2006) This model has been charac-
terised as a hybrid between a corporatist and a residual model3 (Valencia,
2006. And this fragmented and unequal model has prevailed until the pres-
ent (see Valencia, 2010).
In this context, at the beginning of the 1980s, the Mexican economy faced
adverse internal and external factors, which led to a severe economic crisis.
In the middle of these adverse circumstances, former President Miguel de la
Madrid, accompanied by young elite, started a new presidential term in 1982.
This new policy elite has often label as politicians technocrats, characterised
for having a graduate degree from a foreign university, especially from fa-
mous American universities, and with important old-school ties with foreign
banks and multilateral institutions (Babb, 2002). Indeed, the arrival of this
“technocracy” into power signified a turning point in contemporary Mexican
history. Their arrival marked the beginning of comprehensive economic re-
forms and a shift in the provision of social protection for the population
(Camp, 2003). These changes signified the introduction of a neoliberal para-
digm, which comprised the redefinition of the role of the Mexican state in the
economy and society.
In accordance with the new paradigm, the Mexican government started
leaving behind the apparent attempts of previous governments to provide a
minimum social base for all Mexican citizens, based on universal education,
compensatory policies and some universal subsidies (Brachet-Márquez,
2004; 1994). The Mexican state thus retreated from its role of welfare provider
to its citizens, as it happened in other Latin American countries (Haagh,
2002). Accordingly, apart from those funds devoted to paying for public health
and education services, social spending was drastically reduced between
1982 and 1988 (Piester, 1997). 
Despite this difficult scenario, people from the same political elite mana-
ged to keep power in the 1988 federal election. In fact, these technocrats, in
particular those U. S.-trained economists, “whose views emerged during the De
la Madrid administration were promoted to top policy positions during the
subsequent administrations of Carlos Salinas (1988–94) and Ernesto Zedillo
(1994-2000). Thus, in the ensuing years, Mexico’s free-market policy path
was consolidated” (Fourcade-Gourinchas & Babb, 2002: 561). The continua-
tion of the technocratic elite in the federal government guaranteed the con-
tinuation of structural reforms aiming at liberalisation of the economy. 
Nonetheless, this continuation did not imply that the Mexican federal gov-
ernment did exactly the same over the years. There were important policy
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3 According to Richard Morris Titmuss (1974), in the residual model, the market and the family are the principal
means through which individuals must meet their needs. Additionally, individuals have access to social assistance pro-
vided by the state only in extreme cases, that is, in case they are unable to participate in the market or lack family sup-
port. In addition, the aid received from the state must be on a temporary basis.adjustments in each administration, although they essentially keep the neo-
liberal spirit. In the case of social policy, the following government introduced
a new anti-poverty programme, which marked the beginning of a new para-
digm in the social policy realm. In the next sub-section, this programme is
briefly discussed.
2.3 The introduction of the anti-poverty strategy (1989-1997) 
In 1988, President Carlos Salinas de Gortari was elected in a highly contro-
versial election. Unlike his predecessor, he did not face a serious economic
crisis, but a political one. The new government was thus eager to gain legit-
imacy among most Mexicans. Under these circumstances, a new strategy for
alleviating poverty was born in 1989. This anti-poverty programme was called
Pronasol, an acronym from Programa Nacional de Solidaridad (National So-
lidarity Programme, in English), which was also known as Solidaridad (soli-
darity, in English). At the same time, federal government continued economic
deregulation, and financial and commercial liberalisation processes initiated
by the previous administration. 
The main policy objectives of  Pronasol were the following: to alleviate ex-
treme poverty and to encourage participation of the poor in the implemen-
tation of this programme as a condition to obtain benefits. Apart from the
idea that the state should only focus on help to the poorest, this new anti-
poverty programme promoted the idea that the poor must be involved in par-
ticipating in the “solution of social problems” (Piester, 1997: 469). Implicitly,
this idea stresses the responsibility of the poor in solving their own condition. 
As for the mechanisms to achieve those objectives are concern, Pronasol
covered a wide range of initiatives through different specific programmes,
including credits to farmers, scholarships for children, and infrastructure pro-
grammes (for instance, building rural schools, roads, and so on). One of
these programmes was Children in Solidarity Programme (Programa Niños en
Salidaridad, in Spanish), which was launched in 1991, and its aim was to pre-
vent that millions of children living in poor families drop out school before
completing primary education (Cordera & Lomelí, 1999). The program was
operating in primary schools which participated in previous Pronasol pro-
grammes. Under this programme, poor families received a cash transfer de-
livered every two months (for only one child per household). In addition,
families received an in-kind transfer (a set of basic food products, such as
beans and milk), as well as nutritional and health care assistance provided by
public local clinics. In fact, this programme could be considered to be the
policy predecessor of the main conditioned cash transfer strategy that was
implemented by the following government (Ibid).  
Another feature of this neoliberal paradigm to tackle poverty was the lack
of attention to inequality. Beyond the theoretical underpinnings of this para-
digm that may contribute to explain this omission, Camp (2003) suggested
CENTRO DE INVESTIGACIÓN EN ALIMENTACIÓN Y DESARROLLO, A.C.
Julio-Diciembre de 2011 17that “the under-representation of humble social origins” among the political
elite may also be part of the explanation: “No empirical evidence exists to
support the notion that social class background directly determines elite pref-
erence. But it is difficult to argue that personal experiences have not sensi-
tized future elites to emphasize specific social issues” (Camp, 2002: 253). 
Although this argument may be debatable, Camp is implicitly making an
important point: elites´ perceptions of poverty constitute a relevant factor to
understand the way this social problem is tackled in developing countries
(see Medrano, 2009; Reis & Moore, 2005). Furthermore, in highly unequal
and weak democracies such as Mexico (especially at that time), policy elite
may enjoy more room to implement their policies. Camp (2002) explained
that, under President Salinas, “technocrats decreased the number of actors
participating in the decision-making process. […] Influential Mexicans who
stressed the necessity of redistributive goals were not given the opportunity
to express their criticisms within the power elite” (Camp, 2002: 254). Under
these circumstances, Mexican technocrats were able to put into practice their
view of tackling poverty without significant resistance.
Despite the official objective (targeting the poorest) of Pronasol, govern-
ment did not implement clear and systematic methods to achieve such a
goal. Focalisation was made mainly by identifying poor neighbourhoods and
communities rather than individuals (Boltvinik, 2004). Furthermore, the iden-
tification of the target population was made using different criteria depend-
ing on the programme. In fact, this programme was highly criticised because
was susceptible to be used as a political tool to legitimise government, to at-
tract the votes of the poor (Cornelius, Craig & Fox, 1994), and to enhance the
image of President Salinas (Dresser, 1994; 1997). For these reasons, Prona-
sol was often regarded more as a political strategy with electoral purposes
than an effective anti-poverty programme (Molinar & Weldon, 1994). More-
over, some funds were deliberately diverted from the poorest (Trejo & Jones,
1998). All these criticisms caused a bad image of Pronasol, which was deeply
transformed by the following administration.
In 1994, President Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de León (1994-2000) began his
presidential term. The top members of the new government had basically
the same technocratic profile as the political elite that took power in 1982. At
the end of 1994 and during 1995, this new government faced a dark
panorama: the political crisis originated by the Zapatista guerrillas, and the
currency crisis. This economic crisis aggravated the social cost provoked by
the introduction of a neoliberal paradigm in the preceding decade. Although
there is no agreement about the extent of the increase in terms of poverty
(Damian, 2002: 107-112), the overall view is that this problem definitely rose
between 1984 and 1994 (Damian, 2002; CEPAL, 2002; Székely, 1998). 
In this context, in 1997, the Mexican government launched a new anti-
poverty initiative, which was called “Progresa”, the Spanish acronym for the
Education, Health and Nutrition Programme. The conceptual framework of
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ago Levy, who became a top cabinet member in the federal government in
the early nineties. He is famous as the architect of Progresa. This programme
constituted the new and improved version of the previous strategy for focal-
ising aid to those living in extreme poverty. Progresa thus become the most
important anti-poverty initiative at federal level until present, and the ulti-
mate example of the implementation of the neoliberal paradigm to tackle
poverty in Mexico. The main characteristics of this paradigm are briefly
analysed in the following section.
3. The neoliberal anti-poverty paradigm in Mexico
3.1 The main principles of the neoliberal poverty paradigm
Despite of the fact that Pronasol was in line with a neoliberal principles, its
policy successor,  Progresa, truly embodies the neoliberal anti-poverty para-
digm that has prevailed in Mexico in the last two decades. This paradigm can
be identified by analysing the main normative beliefs or principles implicit in
Progresa, and which underpins its methods and mechanisms. Overall, the
core ideas of this programme were in line with popular recommendations
advocated by international organizations, such as the Word Bank and the
Inter-American Development Bank. In particular, the programme adopted the
human capital theory supported by these institutions, in particular the Inter-
American Development Bank. Broadly, this theory places the root of poverty
in the lack of human capital, which essentially refers to individuals’ education,
experience and abilities, which allow them to participate in the labour mar-
ket and generate income. Furthermore, this international agency has also
emphasised the role of economic growth as the main factor in reducing
poverty in developing countries (see Sorensen, 2009; BID, 1998). 
Apart from these ideas, there are particular assumptions about the nature
of poverty and the behaviour of the poor rooted in Progresa. The architect of
the programme argued that “policies for the extremely-poor should be based
on their special needs and behaviour” (Levy, 1991: 55). According to Levy, the
extreme poor are those unable to provide for themselves enough food and,
therefore, are unable to display an adequate performance at school or work
(Levy: 1994:18-19).4 This programme departed from the idea that unlike peo-
ple living in extreme poverty, the moderate poor were able to access educa-
tion services, as well as to participate in the labour market, as they do not lack
the very minimum basic resources to survive (Levy, 1991; 1994). In addition,
the architect of  Progresa emphasised that since the “extent of poverty implies
that it cannot be eliminated in a short period of time”, and in a context of
limited resources, government should focus on helping the poorest. Accord-
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4  This definition was adopted by the programme. See: Poder Ejecutivo Federal. Programa Nacional de Educación,
Salud y Alimentación (PROGRESA). Lineamientos Programáticos. México, 1997.ingly, focalisation was made a key principle of the anti-poverty paradigm in
Mexico (Ruckert, 2007; Boltvinik, 2004). Furthermore, extreme poverty was
essentially seen as a rural phenomenon.
Levy also stressed that anti-poverty programmes should  create the con-
ditions for the poor “to grow out of poverty” (Levy, 1991:50). Progresa thus
had a strong emphasis on individuals’ agency to overcome poverty, that is,
the extremely poor themselves should “get on their feet and work their way
out of poverty”. Accordingly, the aim of this programme was to assist the poor
in fulfilling a minimum of health and nutrition so they can “invest in human
capital; or migrate across regions; or participate more actively (even though
risky) in the labour market; or engage in more (risky) innovations (new crops,
techniques); or have less children and increase their investment per child”
(Levy, 1991: 53-54). 
Another premise implicit in the design of Progresa was to avoid “the cre-
ation of a class of welfare dependents” (Levy, 1991: 52). In fact, Levy insisted
that “schemes that simply transfer income to the poor give no incentive for
them to work. Thus, incentive considerations argue strongly against direct
income transfers” (Levy, 1991: 52). In accord with this idea, under Progresa
programme, cash transfers were conditional upon the receivers´ actions. The
aim behind conditionality was thus changing certain behaviours, which were
attributed to the poor.
In respect to the “behavioural characteristics” of the extreme poor identify
by Levy (1991), most of them seem more likely to be externally imposed con-
ditions or unavoidable matters of situational expediency related to the pop-
ulation in question. For instance, one of the consequences of the negative
conditions of children living in poor households in urban and rural areas,
such as child labour, was deemed to be a behavioural characteristic of the
poor:
The children of the extremely poor may participate early in economic activities in
both urban (begging, shoe shining) and rural (working in family farm, household
activities) settings. Independently of the educational facilities, the opportunity
cost of the household of having children in school is too high, so that the ex-
tremely-poor, as opposed to the moderately poor, may not be in the position to
benefit from educational programmes (Levy, 1991: 47).
Other behavioural characteristics identified by Levy are also essentially des-
criptions of the results of living in severe deprivation, such as the fact that the
extremely-poor have “lower ability to bear risk” because “they live so close to
income-induced nutritional risks” (Levy, 1991: 48). Another example is that
“the composition of the diet of the extremely-poor is different”: “At very low
income levels, households consume a diet composed by cheap calories”
(Levy, 1991: 49). In addition, Levy thought that intrahousehold inequality was
higher among people living in extreme poverty. However, he recognised that
this problem was “probably not unique to the extreme poor, it is operationally
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as a whole translates for each member of the household” (Levy, 1991: 50).
Other characteristic identified by Levy were having “higher fertility ratios
and more children per household” than the non-poor (Levy, 1991: 45). The
author acknowledged that this characteristic “can be interpreted as the in-
surance response parents make in the face of high infant mortality”. He
added, it “may also be due to lack of education access and access to birth
control methods”. Finally, the low inability of the extremely-poor “to respond
to transitory real wage decline by working more hours” was also identified as
a behavioural characteristic: “Downturns cannot be offset by working more if
households are already working all they can” (Levy, 1991: 47). Many of these
assumptions about poverty included in the ideational core in Progresa are
succinctly described in the following lines:
[The extremely-poor] have a prior need to improve their health and nutritional
status and break the ‘vicious circle’ in which they find themselves: unhealthy
physical environments, morbidity, lethargy, high infant mortality and high fertil-
ity, inability to take risks, inability to demand education, thinly spread resources
across large families, and transmission of this state of affairs from one genera-
tion to the next. Only when this vicious circle is broken can they ‘get on their
feet’ and work their way out of poverty (Levy, 1991: 54).
Overall, the policy design of Progresa responded to this ideational core,
which represents the essence of the anti-poverty paradigm dominant in Mexi-
co at federal level.  Under this paradigm, the social policy thus took a resi-
dual character and was directed at alleviating poverty only when markets and
family networks fail (Valencia, 2010; Boltvinik, 2004; Laurell, 2003). Although
the previous programme (Pronasol) was also focused on alleviating extreme
poverty, Progresa included new mechanisms and methods. In the following
sub-section, the main characteristics of the mechanism and methods of this
programme are briefly described.
3.2 Methods and mechanisms 
In accord with the main ideas implicit in the design of Progresa, the ultimate
goal of the programme was to break the intergenerational transmission of
poverty. The main mechanism to accomplish this official objective was a con-
ditioned cash transfer strategy to aid the extreme poor families in rural areas.5
This strategy had three salient characteristics. First, the programme involved
a means-tested cash transfer delivered every two months to mothers of poor
children conditional upon the school attendance of their children6 and regu-
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5 In 2002, the programme started to cover poor households in urban areas.
6 The amount of the scholarship is slightly higher for girls after elementary school to encourage them to stay in
school for longer.lar medical check-ups for the family, especially for children, pregnant and
nursing women (SEDESOL, 1998). In addition, families also received nutritional
supplements. The conditions to receive social assistance show the centrality
of the co-responsibility of poor families in this programme (SEDESOL, 1998).   
The second characteristic was that the federal government used technical
criteria to achieve the target population. The targeting methodology implied
an important difference from the early attempts to target the poor (such as
Pronasol). The methodology includes two main steps.7 First, the poor locali-
ties are selected according to the marginality index of the National Council of
Population (CONAPO) and other indicators available for the specific area. In ad-
dition, the availability of education and health centres is also confirmed as
prerequisites to operate the programme. The next stage is a survey of the
household, which is “assessed” by a points system using a statistical method,
discriminant analysis, which determines if the household is poor or non-poor
based on the information from the survey (Orozco & Hubert, 2005). The third
characteristic of Progresa was that cash transfers were capped in order to
avoid welfare dependency.
The policy design of this programme involves different assumptions. For
instance, behind the idea of investing in children´s human capital is the sup-
position that children will have the chance to increase their well-being in the
future. In particular, it was expected that once children get basic education or
training, they would be in a better condition to participate in the labour mar-
ket and, therefore, to get out of poverty by themselves. According to this,
deprivation is essentially seen as a result of low or lack of education. And low
education or training was, in turn, mainly associated to precarious nutrition
and health. Indeed, similarly to Levy, Székely and Fuentes (2002) claimed
that targeted programmes, such as Progresa, attack “the causes of poverty
(lack of education) and not just its consequences (low incomes)”. In this
sense, Progresa departed from placing the main cause of poverty at individ-
ual level: lack of human capital.
Another key premise of in Progresa´s design is that conditionality is an
essential feature to make anti-poverty programmes effective. Therefore,
under Progresa, beneficiaries were asked to fulfil specific and verifiable con-
ditions (school attendance of children and regular use of primary health care
by mothers and children) in order to receive monetary transfers. In other
words, conditionality is considered to be the only way to guarantee that pa-
rents invest in their children´s human capital. The underlying conviction is
that the poor do not know or refuse to do what is good for them and, there-
fore, “they need to be told by government” (Adato & Hoddinott, 2007: 3).
Furthermore, since Progresa focused on extreme poor families with school-
age children, it was also implicit that those worthy (or deserving) to be helped
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7 This method remained the same until 2002, when some modifications were introduced in order to target the ex-
treme poor in urban areas.were such children. In consequence, the programme excluded many children
living in poverty. In the first place, Progresa excluded poor households in
urban areas. In addition, children covered by the programme should be at-
tending from the third grade of primary school to secondary school (this
means children from eight to fifteen years old, approximately). In other
words, children below about eight years or in high school were not potential
beneficiaries of Progresa. Moreover, since the benefits were subject to chil-
dren's regular school attendance and medical check-ups, it only operated in
areas where clinics and schools were available. Therefore, the extreme poor
families living in areas which lack this infrastructure were not covered by the
programme. 
In 1997, Progresa started by covering over 300,000 families in marginal
rural areas in twelve states. The programme expanded at a fast pace, and by
the end of the year 2000, when President Zedillo finished his term, it was
covering almost 2,500,000 families living in rural areas in all thirty one states
of Mexico. The following government continued the programme. However,
the new government introduced important modifications to the programme
after 2000. In this year, a new political era started in Mexico. Nonetheless,
during this new government, the neoliberal poverty paradigm was fully con-
solidated. This period is briefly reviewed in the next section.
3.3 The consolidation of
Progresa-Oportunidades programme (2000-2006)
The beginning of the new millennium was also the start of a new political era
in Mexico. In that year, President Vicente Fox took office (2000 – 2006), and
his presidency brought into power the main right-wing political party in Me-
xico, Partido Acción Nacional (National Action Party, in English), for the first
time in over seven decades. The arrival of this right-wing government, thus,
ended more than seventy years of hegemony of the previous ruling party.
Furthermore, unlike previous political transitions, Mexico enjoyed economic
stability. Undoubtedly, the new administration signified important political
changes in this country. Nonetheless, the economic and anti-poverty policy
remained essentially the same as that implemented in the previous govern-
ment. An important factor behind this policy continuity was the permanence
of key members of the policy elite in charge of designing the economic and
social policy during the former administration.
Another factor that contributed to the continuation of Progresa when Presi-
dent Fox took office was its early evaluations (Mena, 2007). In particular, the
evaluation conducted by the International Food Policy Research Institute in
2000, concluded that the programme was working as expected in the main
areas of intervention: education, health and nutrition (IFPRI, 2000). The over-
all conclusion was children living in rural areas enrolled in the Programme
were more likely to attend school, to receive medical attention more fre-
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targeting mechanisms provided transparency to Progresa, which reduced
doubts about the potential misuse of the funds by public authorities, as had
happened with the preceding anti-poverty programme, Pronasol. Indeed,
during this government, transparency in allocating anti-poverty funds was
notably improved (Hevia, 2010). This improvements and the positive evalua-
tion helped strengthen the program’s legitimacy in Mexico, and to interna-
tional recognition, including a loan of one billion dollars from the
Inter-American Development Bank.
Progresa, thus, remained the most important anti-poverty programme
during Fox´s administration. The programme, however, registered some
changes. Firstly, in 2002, Progresa was included in a wider anti-poverty strat-
egy, which was named “Contigo”.8 In reality, Contigo acted as a conceptual
umbrella to organize and operate different social programmes. This strategy
combined the human capital idea introduced by Progresa and Sen’s capabil-
ities approach. Accordingly, the long term objective of the programme was to
expand the capabilities and opportunities enjoyed by the poor. The logic was
that with a better provision of human capital it is expected that poor children
will develop a wider range of valuable capabilities and, as a consequence,
more freedom to choose a life without poverty. This logic was called a human
development approach.
The discourse embedded in Contigo was, thus, perfectly in line with the
development agenda proposed by the World Bank, which proposed an in-
crease in human capital and capabilities as the best way to alleviate poverty
(World Bank, 2000). Indeed, Charnock (2006) compared World Bank’s flag-
ship publications prepared for the region and the Fox’s government National
Plan of Development and found striking similarities. He concluded that “the
Fox government’s vision of  Mexico is almost identical to that of the World
Bank” (Charnock, 2006). The open inclusion of Sen’s approach into the
poverty discourse emphasised the idea of improving human capital rather
than assisting the poor. 
Furthermore, government also explicitly recognised the inequality in the
opportunities to access basic services and employment among Mexicans
(Székely, 2003). In fact, in 2002, Progresa was renamed “Oportunidades” (op-
portunities in English). However, these inequalities were approached from an
individualistic perspective, that is, the emphasis was put on the differences
among individuals in terms of their access to nutrition, basic healthcare and
education. This perspective ignored the structural causes behind the chronic
and pervasive socio-economic inequality in Mexico. In consequence, the aim
of Oportunidades was to give the chance to extremely poor children to fulfil
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of it. A summary of the strategy was presented in the work undertaken by the World Bank to evaluate poverty and the gov-
ernment strategy in Mexico and published in 2004. such capabilities, and, therefore, closing the gap between them and other
children in terms of their access to basic services and food. 
According to this new discourse, poverty is understood as capability-de-
privation, specifically lack of access to minimum nutrition, health care and
education. The discourse embedded in Oportunidades programme also in-
cluded the adoption of a human right approach and the recognition of ine-
quality. Nonetheless, Oportunidades kept focused on targeting aid to the
extreme poor households with school-age children. In other words, the poli-
cy design of the programme remained basically the same to that of the pre-
vious one (Progresa): new politics, same recipe. However, apart from adapting
new discursive elements, government made some important adjustments.
In 2002, apart from the conceptual adjustments and changing the name,
Oportunidades (formerly Progresa) incorporated some changes in its design
to expand its coverage into semi urban and urban areas. In order to incor-
porate poor people in urban areas, a self-targeting method was introduced,
which allowed poor families to sign up as potential beneficiaries. Once they
signed up, applicants then were subjected to a survey at their home in order
to determine if they qualified or not for the programme. Another novelty was
the introduction of scholarships to students in high school (SEDESOL, 2006).  
At the end of 2004, five million families were receiving the programme. Al-
though poor families with children had been the main target population since
the creation of Progresa, the federal government did not openly seek to eradi-
cate child poverty. However, during the Fox administration children were put
in a special place in the policy agenda, at least at a discursive level. During
this administration the government renewed its commitment to children’s
rights. Nonetheless, this pledge involved deep contradictions, which are fur-
ther discussed in the following section.
4. Human rights and neoliberalism in Mexico:
mixing oil and water?
4.1 The human rights discourse under neoliberalism
At the same time that Mexican government was putting into practice a neo-
liberal paradigm, it claimed to support children’s rights. In 1989, Mexico
signed the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), which was ratified in
the following year. The Convention uniquely places children centre-stage in
the quest for the universal application of human rights, by recognising chil-
dren and young people as individuals with rights. The core principles of the
Convention are non-discrimination; devotion to the best interests of the child;
the right to life, survival and development; and respect for the views of the
child. The CRC specifies the socio-economic and cultural rights of the chil-
dren. These rights include the right to a decent standard of living, the right
to social security, the right to basic health, the right to education, and the
right to shelter, among others. 
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dren – either through their guardians or directly – have the right to help from
the government if they are poor or in need.” In other words, all children who
may require social assistance are entitled to it in order to fulfil their socio-eco-
nomic rights. Furthermore, Article 4 of the CRC also established that: “With
regard to economic, social and cultural rights, States Parties shall undertake
such measures to the maximum extent of their available resources and,
where needed, within the framework of international co-operation.” In other
words, the CRC promotes universal access to social assistance, among other
socio-economic rights, for children under the principle of the maximum ex-
tent of resources available in a given country. 
The normative framework of the CRC is based on the principles of univer-
sality, indivisibility of rights, and progressivity, among others. The effective
adoption of this framework involves the establishment of specific mecha-
nisms and goals, according to the aforementioned framework (Minujin, Ce-
silini & Help, 2010). From this perspective, policy action aims at contributing
to the realisation of human rights and may also embrace human rights prin-
ciples. In fact, in the case of poverty, from a human rights approach, this
problem is seen as “multi-dimensional, encompassing not only a low income,
but also other forms of deprivation and loss of dignity” (Donald & Motershaw,
2009: 11-12). Furthermore, human rights are a matter of entitlement and
duty, therefore governments have legal obligations for which they can be held
accountable (Donald & Motershaw, 2009). Accordingly, rights-based ap-
proaches to poverty and development give especial attention to values such
as social justice, equity, equality and solidarity (Chapman, 2005).
By ratifying the CRC, the Mexican government acquired the duty to respect,
protect, promote and fulfil children’s rights under the principles established
in this international instrument, such as universality, non-discrimination, and
the best interests of the child. In this sense, Mexico committed to protect chil-
dren´s welfare under a human rights approach. Furthermore, the Mexican
government agreed to hold itself accountable for this commitment before
the international community, as well as to develop and undertake all actions
and policies in the light of the best interests of the children. Nonetheless,
after 1990, the Mexican federal government kept a rather low profile in terms
of openly and widely promoting the rights of children. Explicit policies to pro-
tect children´s rights were practically absent. 
It was until 1995 that Mexico launched the National Programme in Favour
of Children 1995-2000 (Programa Nacional de Acción en Favor de la Infancia,
in Spanish). This programme established some general actions in order to ac-
complish Mexico’s commitments to fulfil children’s rights. Nonetheless, these
actions were directed to improving some health and education indicators,
such as reducing infant mortality and education coverage. In addition, the
government announced the creation of a programme directed to helping the
most vulnerable children, which would be Progresa. In other words, the Mexi-
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an anti-poverty policy that contradicted the universalistic spirit of the CRC. 
However, during Fox´s administration, children´s rights were introduce in
the agenda again. In 2000, the federal law to protect children’s rights was
approved. This law made explicit the right of children to have access to
healthcare and education services. However, it did not explicitly recognise
other socio-economic rights such as social assistance. Furthermore, the law
established that the parents, tutors and carers are responsible for guaran-
teeing children’s rights, while the government’s responsibility is limited “to
promoting actions seeking to provide assistance” to them in this task. In
other words, the Mexican state adopted a rather limited role in fulfilling chil-
dren’s rights.
Nonetheless, During Fox’s presidency, children took a special place in the
federal agenda, at least at discourse level. Hence, the prevalent policy para-
digm, embodied in the Oportunidades programme, was enriched with a
human rights flavour. In this administration, the federal government pledged
its commitment to children’s well-being right from the very beginning of the
presidential term. This commitment was established in the National Plan of
Development (2001-2006), which is the document that defined the main
goals and strategies of the pubic action to be taken in the governmental term.
In this Plan, government proposed “to create the conditions that allow
children to develop in an emotionally and physically safe environment, guar-
antying their well-being, education, health and equity”. As opportunely noted
by some civil organizations devoted to promoting children’s rights in Mexico,
this statement does not show an explicit commitment to guarantee children’s
rights, but to contribute to their well-being (Sauri, 2003). Nonetheless, fed-
eral government openly adopted a pro-human rights discourse to justify ac-
tions directed at contributing to children’s well-being. Accordingly, in 2001,
the federal government created a special committee to developing or coor-
dinating policies to support children’ rights. This committee was called COIA
(acronym of Consejo Nacional para la Infancia y la Adolescencia in Spanish).
Furthermore, federal government committed itself to monitoring children’s
rights in Mexico.
Additionally, in 2002, Mexico participated in a Special Session of the Gen-
eral Assembly of the United Nations in Favour of Children. In order to ac-
complish the commitments established in the Special Session, the Mexican
government launched the Action Programme 2002-2010 called “A Mexico Fit
for Children and Teenagers” (Un México apropiado para la infancia y la ado-
lescencia, in Spanish). In this programme, federal government established
the strategies to contribute to fulfilling children’s rights in Mexico. These
strategies were framed in the Contigo strategy (the conceptual umbrella that
articulated anti-poverty programmes during this government). In fact, al-
though, in theory, the COAI should design this Action Programme, in practice,
this committee practically disappeared after its creation (see Sauri, 2003).
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programme, which has been in charge of designing and implementing the
anti-poverty programme, Oportunidades. 
This brief account of the Mexican government´s main actions to promote
children´s rights shows that there is an important inconsistency. Those ac-
tions were inserted into the official neoliberal strategy to combat poverty. In
particular, during Fox´s administration, the strategies established in the Ac-
tion Programme were directed to eradicating extreme poverty, increasing the
coverage and quality of education, promoting gender equality, and improv-
ing mother’s health. Indeed, the Action Programme emphasised the role of
“Oportunidades” (formely Progresa) in achieving the commitments of the Spe-
cial Session.This focalised programme was, thus, made the most important
instrument to achieve children’s rights.  Before further discussing this point,
in the following section, the perceptions of some key policy actors about the
policy options to protect the socio-economic rights of the children are pre-
sented.
4.2 Protecting children´s rights in Mexico:
the perceptions of policy actors
In order to enrich the discussion about the compatibility between neolibera-
lism and a human rights approach in Mexico to protect children, this paper
explores the views of policy actors related to different areas of the social poli-
cy realm in Mexico.9 They were specifically asked what policy actions they con-
sidered to be adequate to guarantee socio-economic rights of the children,
in particular, access to quality health care and education services and a de-
cent living standard. In addition, respondents were also asked their opinion
about poverty to being seen as a form of violating human rights.
The general view was that poverty is a violation of human rights. However,
some respondents thought that although it is desirable to fulfil children’s rights
it is practically impossible to accomplish this. Accordingly, children’s rights
should be seen as a normative ideal rather than a concrete objective, and,
therefore, public action should be directed to progressively move towards
such an ideal. There were also few disagreements and concerns around the
idea that poverty implies a human rights violation. Some people from the fe-
deral government, for instance, cast doubts on the validity of such a link by
saying that poverty may coincide with violation of some rights but poverty it-
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9 This analysis was based on sixteen in-depth, semi-structured interviews conducted from the end of 2005 to 2006,
in Mexico City. At the time of conducting the interviews, the respondents were former or current senior members of the
federal government working for the Ministries of Education, Social Development or the System for Family Development,
members of Congress, academics and heads or founders of civil organizations related to human rights promotion, in-
cluding children´s rights, as well as a philanthropic organization. Academics were members of public institutions. Some
of the respondents were also members of the Advisory Panel of UNICEF-Mexico at the time. These respondents were part
of a bigger study group. This analysis is focused on the respondents’ answers related to children´s rights.self cannot be considered to be a violation of human rights. Another mem-
ber of the federal government emphasised the risk of placing citizens’ rights
in the spotlight without stressing their responsibilities. This person believed
that “rights and responsibilities come together”, and therefore, there should
not be a “passive interpretation of human rights”, in which it is assumed that
only government has responsibilities. This respondent added that “the poor
have rights as long as they are responsible at the same time”. Simi- larly, a
person from academic circles thought that poverty itself is not a violation of
rights, but “may generate conditions which imply violations of rights”. 
As far as the policies to guarantee socio-economic rights of the children
are concerned, most respondents talked about increasing the quality of
health care and education services provided by the government. Overall,
most respondents mentioned that public schools' infrastructure and teaching
quality must be improved. However, there were also important differences
among actors´ policy preference to protect children´s rights. Some respon-
dents, especially member of the federal government, considered Oportunida-
des programme to be a good way to guarantee children´s rights, especially
access to education and health care. A member of the federal government
said that although this programme does not guarantee all children’s rights,
helps to do so.  
On a different line of thought, other policy actors (in particular, heads of
civil organizations and academics) talked about the introduction of a new po-
licy approach to guarantee children’ rights, which should far more compre-
hensive than “helping families through little money benefits”. Some of these
respondents openly criticised the current government’s approach to ad-
dressing children’s rights. For instance, a head of a civil organization thought
that government should implement policies focused on children, and that
such policies have not been implemented because the idea “that childcare is
a private issue”, concerning families, has been prevalent in Mexico. This per-
son also stated that "society and the government should take responsibility
for all children”. These respondents overall agreed that it was necessary to
implement universal policies to guarantee education and health care ser-
vices. An academic also talked about increasing attention to early education
and child care facilities for working families, as well as the necessity to pro-
vide meals, school materials and recreational activities for children at school,
and even to guarantee minimum income for all families.  
In accord with these ideas, other respondents (especially heads of civil or-
ganizations) mentioned that the enforceability of social-economic rights
should be guaranteed by the government. It was also suggested that the ju-
dicial systems or a “special jurisdiction” should protect citizens' and children’s
socio-economic rights. An academic thought that “children's rights cannot
be guaranteed if the rights of adults are not guaranteed as well”. This per-
son thought children deserve special attention because they have different
necessities; however, there should not be only attention to them and forget-
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dent from a civil organization explained that in order to protect all children’s
rights it was necessary to implement a “national council that effectively co-
ordinates public policies directed to children”, and a “national system of in-
formation and monitoring”.  This respondent also emphasised that although
the government has intended to implement these two initiatives, it has failed
due to the lack of a real commitment and “political will” to effectively protect
children’s´ rights. 
According to these results, there were to rather different views on the poli-
cy initiatives to protect the socio-economic rights of the children in Mexico.
Overall, some respondents, especially members of the federal government,
held a positive view of Oportunidades programme as a way to protect chil-
dren´s rights. On the other hand, this programme was at best considered to
be one complementary action that should be inserted in a wider policy strat-
egy effectively designed to protect children´s rights. In the following section,
the limitations of the neoliberal anti-poverty paradigm to protect children´s
rights are further discussed.
4.3 The paradoxical link between
children´s rights and neoliberalism  
The Oportunidades programme certainly contributed at least partially to fulfi-
lling some rights of children living in extreme poverty, such as access to edu-
cation and health care services. Nonetheless, its design was in conflict with
the basic principles of a human rights approach. To start with, Oportunidades
programme has provided social assistance to extreme poor families with
school-age children under a utilitarian vision: it is useful to invest in chil-
dren´s human capital so they can participate in the labour market in the fu-
ture (Ornelas, 2006), not because children have the right to it. Moreover, as
discussed before, conditionality aims at modifying the conduct of poor fam-
ilies so they invest in their children’s human capital. This could be demean-
ing as it assumed that the poor need to be told by government what is good
for them (Adato & Hoddinott, 2007: 3).
Furthermore, focalisation implies a violation of the principle of universali-
ty that embedded in the human rights approach. As far as basic social ser-
vices is concern, this approach “dictates that the principle of universality takes
priority over that of selectivity” (Minujin et al., 2006: 26). Contrary to this uni-
versalistic aim, the Oportunidades programme left behind many children liv-
ing in poverty. For instance, children who do not attend at least third grade
school, or do not live in families classed as extreme poor, even though they
may be poor, do not receive any social assistance. In addition, children must
live in communities with healthcare and education facilities, which is likely
not to be the case in the most remote or deprived areas of the country.
Apart from the very fact that this programme let unprotected many chil-
dren, failing at guarantying universal access of basic social services seems to
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demoortele (2000) considered universal access to basic services to be a bet-
ter option because creates “a social shock-absorber in times of crisis”, which
helps “sustain the globalisation process and make it more inclusive” (Vande-
moortele, 2000). He added that:
Basic social services are key to trigger the virtuous circle of social and economic
development. [...] The notion of participation is central to the human rights ap-
proach to development: the poor become engaged subjects of development,
rather than being passive objects; they are strategic partners, rather than target
groups. Universal access to basic social services will build the solid foundation
for meaningful participation” (Vandemoortele, 2000: 23).
In other words, focalised or narrowly targeted programmes, such as Opor-
tunidades, pursue efficiency, but by doing so they overlook higher aims (for
instance, protecting children´s rights). Vandemoortele argued that, in case of
basic social services, universal access should be guaranteed by governments
(Vandemoortele, 2000: 11). In addition, focalisation entails different costs
and disadvantages (see Sen, 1994; Cornia & Stewart, 2003). For instance,
administrative costs of narrow targeting are at least twice as high as for un-
targeted programme (Vandemoortele, 2000: 11). Focalisation also involves
out-of-pocket costs: since narrow targeting usually requires beneficiaries to
document their eligibility, that is, they need to prove that live in extreme
poverty, they incur in some expenses such as transportation and other costs
(Vandemoortele, 2000: 11-12).   
Furthermore, targeting can also compromise effectiveness in terms of
poverty reduction. In fact, there is also “ample evidence of poor countries
that have significantly reduced poverty through universalistic approaches to
social provision” (Mkandawire, 2005: 16). In developed societies, “overall so-
cial policy itself has been universalistic, and targeting has been used as sim-
ply one instrument for making universalism effective” (Mkandawire, 2000).
In this sense, another cost of focalisation is actually failing to reach the poor.
Another important problem attached to targeting is the social stigma asso-
ciated with means testing (Mkandawire, 2005), which is certainly incompati-
ble with a human rights perspective. Nonetheless, social stigma attached to
focalisation has had little attention in Mexico. 
Oportunidades has another important limitation to protect children´s
rights. Children covered by this programme are not entitled to receive social
assistance because the law explicitly says so, but because the federal govern-
ment have decided that they qualify to be welfare beneficiaries. Since the pro-
gramme is based on administrative rules (technical procedures decided by
governmental authorities), its continuity over time may be endangered, as
one simple administrative decision could end the programme and, therefore,
the support to poor families (Valencia, 2006; Boltvinik & Damián, 2003). Con-
versely, under a rights-based approach, social protection is not a policy op-
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(Barrientos & Hulme, 2008: 6).  
Since universal access to social assistance was not guaranteed by Mexican
law, government´s commitment to protect all children’s rights is limited
(Sepúlveda, 2009). As discussed before, the enforceability of socio-economic
rights is a mechanism to effectively protect such rights (Courtis, 2007). In ad-
dition, this can contribute to diminish the potential political manipulation of
Oportunidades. Despite of the fact that the design of this programme has
improved transparency in the distribution of resources, it is still subject to
particular forms of political manipulations due to the emerge of new inter-
mediaries between governmental authorities and the beneficiaries of the pro-
gram (see Hevia, 2010).
Additionally, although government compromised to monitoring the
achievement of children’s rights in Mexico, this was poorly done during those
years (Sauri, 2003). In fact, the Mexican government created a public organ-
ization specifically devoted to measuring poverty, which actually has released
poverty rates on a regular basis from 2002.10 Indeed, this initiative consti-
tuted a major step in making public and transparent official poverty figures.
Nonetheless, child poverty rates were not made public on a regular basis by
this institution during and before Fox´s administration. This omission was
thus particular controversial because contradicted the government’s com-
mitment to monitoring children’s rights in Mexico.
Despite of the fact that the Mexican government displayed a human rights
discourse during the last decades, in particular, during Fox´s administration,
its actions contradicted the spirit of such approach. A careful reading of the
commitment expressed by federal government shows that its pledge to ful-
filling children’s rights was subordinated to the neoliberal principles of the
anti-poverty paradigm. Although the evolution of the main anti-poverty pol-
icy shows some advance in coverage, it focused on the extreme poor house-
holds with school-age children. Furthermore, the Mexican federal government
was not fully committed to fulfilling children’s rights, but to contribute to their
well-being through a limited strategy. In short, the neoliberal anti-poverty
paradigm failed to recognise the universal rights of all children to have a de-
cent way of life and to access social assistance.
5. Conclusions
Human rights approaches depart from the idea that every human being is
worthy of respect (Gauri, 2004). In particular, these approaches advocate the
protection of the rights of children, ethnic and religious minorities, women,
and the poor because these groups are “particularly liable to practices and
prejudices that weaken their agency and the social basis of their self-esteem”
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10This organization is CONEVAL (acronym Consejo Nacional de Evaluación de la Política de Desarrollo Social, in Spanish).  (Gauri, 2004: 472). In addition, a human right approach is based on the prin-
ciples of universality, indivisibility of rights, and progressivity, which involves
the establishment of specific mechanisms goals according to this aim (Min-
ujin, Cesilini & Help, 2010).  
Since 1989, the Mexican government started its commitment to protect-
ing and ensuring all children's socio-economic and cultural rights, including
the rights to a decent way of life. In this year, Mexico signed the CRC, which
promotes universal access to social assistance for children, among other
socio-economic rights, under the principle of the maximum extent of re-
sources available in a given country. However, in the last two decades, gov-
ernment´s actions have hardly been consistent with this duty. Under the
neoliberal paradigm, social policy was focused on reducing extreme poverty.
At the core of the main anti-poverty programme (Oportunidades) is the idea
that parents must invest in their children´s human capital, so these children
can participate in the labour market and make their own way out of poverty
in the future. 
The embedded paradigm in this programme has proved to be the domi-
nant one over time. The evolution of this paradigm has showed that, despite
some important adjustments, its main goals remained basically the same.
During Fox´s administration, the federal government even renewed its com-
mitment to guarantee children’s rights. However, this pledge was, in fact, fit-
ted to the neoliberal paradigm. This inclusion signified important conceptual
contradictions. The logic of Oportunidades programme challenges some
basic human rights principles, such as universality. Focalisation is certainly
difficult to reconcile with the aim to provide universal access to social assis-
tance, among other socio-economic rights, for children under the principle
of the maximum extent of resources available in a given country. Further-
more, principles such as security, equality and dignity, which are considered
to be “a prerequisite for the acceptance of people living in poverty as equal
full and equal participants in the human rights movement” in democratic so-
cieties (Porter, 2000), are not in the centre of the neoliberal logic. 
Beyond these conceptual contradictions, poverty and inequality are still
the main characteristics of the Mexican social landscape. Despite Mexico´s
relatively wealth and aspirations of being a developed country, most Mexican
children live in poverty. According to the multidimensional measure of poverty
applied by the Mexican government, 53.3 per cent of children lived in poverty
in 2008 (CONEVAL-UNICEF, 2009). From a rights-based approach, child poverty
is a denial of children’s human rights. And judging only by the extent of child
poverty in Mexico, neoliberal governments have showed rather meagre re-
sults in protecting children´s rights. This reality calls for new policy strategies
that successfully integrate a rights-based approach, especially in the case of
children, in Mexico.
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